Implementing Symbols and Rules with Neural Networks

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BROWN

Neural nets at it again



Image Labeling

Reinforcement Learning





Three plus five equals six, if he does it again, in five. 'This kid was f**ked up, that kid was f**ked up, what kind of filth is that, f**k the b*****s' The voice of a gurgling priest on the radio resounded over the din

Natural Language Processing

1. <u>https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/22/1007539/gpt3-openai-language-generator-artificial-intelligence-ai-opinion/</u>

- 2. https://www.alexirpan.com/2018/02/14/rl-hard.html
- 3. https://aclanthology.org/2020.acl-main.463.pdf

NNs reason over points in space



Humans reason over abstractions



Actions: { U, □, □, □, □, □ } → always (above (head, feet))

Text: {"three", "plus", "five", "equals", ...} → 3 + 5 =

Humans reason over abstractions





Text: {"three", "plus", "five", "equals", ...} → 3 + 5 =

Logical Rules

Humans reason over abstractions





Text: {"three", "plus", "five", "equals", ...} → 3 + 5 =

Logical Rules applied to symbolic Concepts

Structured Compositional Concepts

"The ability to produce/ understand some sentences is *intrinsically* connected to the ability to produce/understand certain others...[they] *must be made of the same parts*." (Fodor&Pylyshyn, 1988)

on(cat, mat) != on(mat, cat)

Structured Compositional Concepts

- Two questions:
 - 1. Can Do NNs *learn to implement* such a definition?
 - 2. If so, how would we know?

Evaluating compositionality via behavior Systematic Generalization Tasks



Evaluating compositionality via behavior Systematic Generalization Tasks



Systematic Generalization Tasks



Not Sufficient: Models that don't meet our definition can still succeed

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Not Sufficient: Models that don't meet our definition can still succeed



Issue #1: For today's models, we often can't inspect the training data directly. (Even when its available, its too large to inspect fully and exactly.)

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Issue #2: "Unseen" is not well defined when we are working with distributed representations

Not Sufficient: Models that don't meet our definition can still succeed



Issue #2: "Unseen" is not well defined when we are working with distributed "Epresentations not the same as "composed of"

Not Necessary: Models that meet our definition could still fail

Evaluating compositionality via behavior Not Necessary: Models that meet our definition could still fail



Evaluating compositionality via behavior Not Necessary: Models that meet our definition could still fail



Issue #1: Compositional systems are allowed to make mistakes!

Bad visual perception does not entail "not compositional"

Evaluating compositionality via behavior Not Necessary: Models that meet our definition could still fail



Issue #2: Compositional systems are allowed to be probabilistic!

Priors can (and often do) outweigh evidence, even in symbolic systems.

Structured Compositional Concepts

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18 high level concepts composed from 8 basic concepts



18 high level concepts = {shape}



18 high level concepts = {shape} x {layout}



18 high level concepts = {shape} x {layout} x {stroke}

High-Level API



High-Level API



Requirement #1: Predictions are grounded



B: Concepts apply to things in the world E: Concepts are public

Requirement #2: Concepts represent types



C: Constituency Structure: different tokens but a single type (Fodor&Phylyshn 1988)

Requirement #3: Concepts are modular



C: Constituency Structure: constituents obey rules of syntax; changes within a constituent should not have side effects. (Fodor&Phylyshn 1988)

Requirement #4: Concepts are causal



A: Function as Mental Causes and Effects
High-Level API









correlated ("spurious") feature





High-Level API





"The ability to produce/understand some sentences is *intrinsically* connected to the ability to produce/understand certain others... [they] *must be made of the same parts*." (Fodor&Pylyshyn, 1988)



Internal representations of "parts" should be identifiable, and stable(ish) across different inputs.

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High-Level API



















High-Level API



Representations of the parts are causally implicated in the representation of the whole.









blick dax wug bip





Composition across layers?

Composition across layers?







Can errors in the whole be explained by errors in the parts?




Can errors in the whole be explained by errors in the parts in aggregate?



RN From Scratch

ViT CLIP Pretrained











RN From Scratch

ViT CLIP Pretrained



Can errors in the whole be explained by errors in the parts at the instance level?

Can errors in the whole be explained by errors in the parts at the instance level?

RN From Scratch

ViT CLIP Pretrained



High-Level API



Takeaways

- When learning to discriminate visual concepts, end-to-end NNs learn complex internal representations
- These representations meet basic criteria of "structured" compositional representations
 - They are grounded in the external world
 - Complex concepts are built from reusable parts
 - Parts are sufficiently disentangled
 - Representations of parts might be causally implicated in representations of wholes
- Pretrained models show some advantage, but results are preliminary
 - Some desirable inductive biases (shape > color in object naming)
 - Pretrained transformer might fair better on causality tests



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The dog that chases the cats ____ fast run runs

The dog that chases the cats runs fast

The dog that chases the cats runs fast

The dog that chases the cats runs fast

SINGULAR Noun





Item-Specific Learner



Item-Specific Learner



Decision depends entirely on specifics of inputs.

Idealized Symbolic Learner



Idealized Symbolic Learner



Idealized Symbolic Learner



Decision depends only on abstract concept to which the input is mapped, not on the inputs themselves

Symbolic Learner with Noisy Observations



Symbolic Learner with Noisy Observations



Decision depends only on abstract concept, but mapping from input to concept can be item-specific.

Item Specific Idealized Symbolic + Symbolic Noisy Obs.







Experimental Setup

- Model: BERT trained from scratch on Wikipedia Text (manipulated as needed); no fine-tuning
- IO: The dogs that chase the cat [MASK] fast -> P(run) vs. P(runs)
- Data: Natural and Nonce Sentences:
 - Addition of such minor characters {seem, seems} more promotional ...
 - The astronomer of the first session that year {perform, performs}...

Evaluating BERT's Behavior



Effect of Absolute Frequency (Holding Relative Fixed)

#("runs")

Effect of Absolute Frequency (Holding Relative Fixed)

#("runs")

Effect of Relative Frequency (Holding Absolute Fixed)



Effect of Absolute Frequency (Holding Relative Fixed)

#("runs")



Effect of Relative Frequency (Holding Absolute Fixed)

> #("runs") #("run")

Effect of Absolute Frequency (Holding Relative Fixed)

#("runs")

Effect of Relative Frequency (Holding Absolute Fixed)

> #("runs") #("run")


Frequency Effects in Performance

Effect of Absolute Frequency (Holding Relative Fixed)

#("runs")

Effect of Relative Frequency (Holding Absolute Fixed)

> #("runs") #("run")



Evaluating BERT's Behavior











Evaluating BERT's Behavior



Categories of Reasoning

Symbolic Learner with Noisy Observations



Categories of Reasoning

Symbolic Learner with Noisy Observations



Errors in output are due to errors in mapping inputs to concepts, not errors in rule.

Frequency Effects Explained by Errors in Agreement Feature?



Frequency Effects Explained by Errors in Agreement Feature?



Frequency Effects Explained by Errors in Agreement Feature?



Evaluating BERT's Behavior



Pretrained Neural LMs (BERT) exhibit a **mix** of systematic generalization and item-specific memorization

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 - It has to **overcome strong priors**. Related to rel. frequency. (See Lovering et al, 2021)



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- It is in-principle possible for neural networks to be functionally equivalent to the models we traditionally think of as "symbolic reasoners" in cognitive and computer—e.g., BayesNets
- Diagnosing whether this is the case for modern NNs requires multifaceted evaluations that focus on representations, not just behavior
- Progress requires interdisciplinary collaboration and hypothesis-driven research on why NNs produce the outputs they do for a given input

Thank you!

Backup Slides

Question

- Can we predict whether or not a given concept will influence a model's predictions based on:
 - The training data?
 - The model's representations?
 - Some combination of the above?





"Target" feature perfectly predicts label

"Target" feature perfectly predicts label



"Spurious" feature

"Target" feature perfectly predicts label



purious" feature which happens to co-occur with target in training sample



Generalizing well out of training distribution requires using the target feature

Toy Sentence Classification Task

Name	Target	Spurious	Example
contains-1	a '1' occurs in the sequence	a '2' occurs in the sequence	2 4 11 1 4
prefix - duplicate	sequence begins with a duplicate	a '2' occurs in the sequence	5 5 11 12 2
adjacent- duplicate	duplicate occurs somewhere in the sequence	a '2' occurs in the sequence	11 12 3 3 2
first-last	first symbol and last symbol are the same	a '2' occurs in the sequence	7 2 11 12 7

Predicting Inductive Biases of Pretrained Models Jha, Lovering, Linzen, and Pavlick (2020)

Out-of-Distribution Test Error

Training Distribution

Perfect cooccurrence between spurious and target

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Training Distribution

Perfect cooccurrence between spurious and target



Error when s occurs alone (false positive)

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Training Distribution

Spurious occurs without target in **0.1%** of training examples



Error when s occurs alone (false positive)

Predicting Inductive Biases of Pretrained Models Jha, Lovering, Linzen, and Pavlick (2020)

Training Distribution

Spurious occurs without target in **10%** of training examples



Error when s occurs alone (false positive)

Predicting Inductive Biases of Pretrained Models Jha, Lovering, Linzen, and Pavlick (2020)

Training Distribution

Spurious occurs without target in **50%** of training examples



Error when s occurs alone (false positive)

Out-of-Dist Different features behave differently given the same training data.

Training Distribution

Spurious occurs without target in **50%** of training examples



Features differ in how "hard" they are to extract

Information-Theoretic Probing with Minimum Description Length. Voita and Titov (2020)

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Features differ in how "hard" they are to extract







A fine-tuned model's use of a feature (the "target") is a function of both the difficulty of extracting the feature (relative to competing "spurious" features) and the training evidence against the competing spurious features.

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A fine-tuned model's **use of a feature** (the "target") is a function of both the **difficulty of extracting the feature** (relative to competing "spurious" features) and the **training evidence** against the competing spurious features.

MDL of spurious

MDL of target

Higher -> Target is comparatively easier extract

Task: Sentence Acceptability

The piano teachers see the handyman.



Task: Sentence Acceptability

The piano teachers sees the handyman.



Task: Sentence Acceptability

Target Feature: Subject-Verb Agreement

The piano teachers of the lawyer see the handyman.

Task: Sentence Acceptability

Target Feature: Subject-Verb Agreement Spurious Feature #1: Lexical Item

Often, the piano teachers of the lawyer see the handyman.

Task: Sentence Acceptability

Target Feature: Subject-Verb Agreement Spurious Feature #2: Sentence Length

The piano teachers of the lawyer who works in the city across the river see the handyman.

Task: Sentence Acceptability

Target Feature: Subject-Verb Agreement Spurious Feature #3: Plural Nouns

The piano teachers of the lawyers see the handyman.

Task: Sentence Acceptability

Target Feature: Subject-Verb Agreement Spurious Feature #4: Closest Noun Agreement



20 Target-Spurious Feature Pairs









"Average F Score"





The easier target is to extract relative to spurious, the more likely the model is to use the target feature.



The easier target is to extract relative to spurious, the less sensitive the model is to priors in the training data.



When target is much easier to extract than spurious...



When target is much easier to extract than spurious...model learns the right thing despite no training incentive to do so.



When target is much harder to extract than spurious...model requires substantial training incentive (e.g., 5% of training examples).



Frequency Effects on Syntactic Rule Learning in Transformers Wei et al (under review) Do NNs *have* symbolic concepts?

(Computer Vision)

is_grounded

- is_token_of_type
- 👃 is_contxt_independent

] is_causal

Why don't NNs *use* symbols and rules, even if they can? (Toy, NLP/Syntax)



Unit Testing for Concepts in Neural Networks Lovering & Pavlick (in progress)



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Unit Testing for Concepts in Neural Networks Lovering & Pavlick (in progress) Why don't NNs *use* symbols and rules, even if they can? (Toy, NLP/Syntax)





Do NNs apply systematic rules?

Do NNs *have* symbolic concepts?

Models don't necessarily solve the task the best way...even when they are capable of doing so



Frequency Effects on Syntactic Rule Learning in Transformers Wei et al (under review) is grounded

- is_token_of_type
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Unit Testing for Concepts in Neural Networks overing & Pavlick (in progress)

Do NNs apply systematic rules?

Do NNs *have* symbolic concepts?

- Models don't necessarily solve the task the best way...even when they are capable of doing so
- Models sometimes struggled to overcome strong training data priors



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Do NNs apply systematic rules?

Do NNs *have* symbolic concepts?

- Models don't necessarily solve the task the best way...even when they are capable of doing so
- Models sometimes struggled to overcome strong training data priors

 But, when feature representations are sufficiently well encoded, models show correct inductive biases and generalize well despite little/no training incentive to do so

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Predicting Agreement Features



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